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Gauging Fiscal Policy: I 
The incoming Reagan administration is 
committed to cutting tax rates and non-
defense expenditures, while increasing 
defense expenditures. Lower tax rates would 
strengthen incentives for suppliers of labor 
and capital, and might therefore eventually 
speed economic growth from the supply side. 
Combined with lower expenditures, such tax 
cuts also could ultimately be consistent with 
a budget that does not preempt saving from 
private capital formation. But the Federal 
budget deficit may initially increase rather 
than decrease, because of the lag that cou Id 
be expected in bri ngi ng nondefense expen-
ditures under control, at a time when defense 
expenditures were being raised and taxes 
were being reduced. 
Even iftax cuts are successful in stimulating 
economic growth from the supply side, fiscal 
policy will continue to affect capital markets 
and aggregate demand. Given the rather 
large and uncertain budgetary changes in 
prospect, we shou Id try to gauge the size of 
these more trad itional impacts of  fiscal pol  icy 
as the new Administration's program unfolds. 
The generally accepted measure in this area 
is the surplus or deficit in the high-
employment budget -the  size of  the budget 
surplus or deficit when the economy is oper-
ating at a "natural" (full employment) rate of 
unemployment. 
Unfortunately, this indicatoroffiscal policy is 
subject to problems of both concept and 
measurement. One important conceptual 
problem is the question of what should be 
included on both the expenditures and 
receipts side of  the budget. An equally serious 
measurement problem relates to the need to 
infer the natural rate of unemployment by 
means of  econometric modeling, since it is 
not directly observable. In this article, we 
examine the rationale of the high-
employment budget and then consider the 
differences'created by alternative assump-
tions about the natural rate of unemploy-
ment. In a second article, we consider certain 
factors-additions to both the expenditures 
and recei pts sides of  the budget -that  shou Id 
be included in any such analysis. 
Budget rationale 
Budget analysts introduced the concept of  the 
high-employment budget into policy discus-
sions during the early 1960's, for the purpose 
of  separati ng the effect of  the economy on the 
Federal budget from the impact of  discretion-
ary fiscal-policy changes. Higher levels of 
economic activity boost tax receipts and 
reduce some expenditures, such as unem-
ployment compensation; and lower activity 
does the opposite. These induced changes in 
receipts and expenditures act as automatic 
stabilizers by helping to reduce the econ-
omy's response to any shift in total spending, 
but they do not themselves represent inde-
pendent sources of stimulus or restraint. By 
measuring the budget surplus or deficit at a 
constant rate of unemployment, analysts can 
remove cyclically-induced changes in 
expenditures and receipts from their calcula-
tions. The resulting surplus or deficit is a 
rough measure of  the budget's contractionary 
or  expansionary influence on the level of  total 
spending. A budgetary surplus indicates a 
"tight" fiscal policy, in the sense that the 
budget tends to add less to aggregate spend-
ing than it takes away, whereas a deficit 
implies an "easy" fiscal policy in a reverse 
sense. 
Fiscal policy affects output and employment 
in the short run-and by a multiple of  the 
deficit or  su rplus if  monetary pol icy is accom-
modating by providing sufficient money to 
stabilize interest rates. But if the Federal 
Reserve instead holds to a fixed money-
supply target, the fiscal stimulus or restraint 
has a much smaller impacton total spending, 
and therefore on output and employment. In 
the case of a deficit, the debt issues required 
to finance the deficit bid up interest rates in 
capital markets, which in turn discourage 1F~(dl~rr~\ll  ~~8)~flQW~ 
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private investment spending. On the other 
hand, in the case of a budget surplus, the 
lower interest rates induced by debt retire-
ment stimulate private investment spending, 
which provides some offset to the budget's 
restrictive effect on aggregate spending. 
However, with a given stock of money, the 
investment-spending offset to fiscal stimulus 
or restraint is less than complete in the short-
run. The resulting impact on total spending is 
accommodated by movements in the 
velocity of money ci rcu lation caused by the 
changes in interest rates. 
From the point of view of short-run stabiliza-
tion policy, the importantthing is not whether 
the high-employment budget is currently in 
surplus or  deficit, but rather in what  direction 
the budget is moving. This is because most of 
the effects of the current deficit or surplus on 
current output and employment have al ready 
been felt. Thus, a surplus in the high-
employment budget doesn't mean that fiscal 
policy is currently slowing the economy, but 
only that it helped slow itdown in the past. In 
short, the change in the high-employment 
budget measures whether fiscal policy is 
currently propelling the economy forward or 
restraining it. Movement towards a lower 
surplus or larger deficit indicates greater fiscal 
stimulus-an easier policy tending to expand 
current output and employment-and the 
reverse signifies a tighterfiscal policy tending 
to slow economic activity. 
As indicated above, budget deficits can 
"crowd out" a certain amount of private 
capital formation even in the short run (before 
wages and prices fully adjust), provided the 
central bank holds to a fixed monetary target. 
Over a longer period, an easier fiscal pol icy 
(even with monetary accommodation) 
doesn't stimulate output and employment at 
all, but only creates an equal amount of 
crowding out. For example, a shift to an 
easier fiscal policy can expand output and 
employmentfor a time. Butthe resulting pres-
sure on wages and prices must lead to an 
increased demand for a given stock of 
money, which raises interest rates until 
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economic activity faiis back to where It was 
before. At this point, the increased fiscal 
stimulus will be completely offset by the 
decline in private investment spending 
caused by higher interest rates. Even with 
monetary accommodation of the stimulus, 
additional money simply raises wages and 
prices further, and does not affect output and 
employment in the longer run. 
Consequently, the level of  the high-
employment budget measures the degree of 
crowding out that can be expected if  the 
current fiscal policy is permanently main-
tained. A high-employment deficit registers 
the average amount of credit that would be 
preempted by the Federal budget. On the 
other hand, a high-employment surplus 
indicates the amountof  private capital forma-
tion stimulated in the long run by the extra 
credit made available through the retirement 
of  government debt. 
Which unemployment rate? 
In theory, the high-employment budget 
should be calculated on the basis of  the 
"natural" rate of  unemployment, which is the 
unemployment rate towards which the 
economy gravitates in the long run. However, 
this number is not directly observable, but 
instead must be estimated. We know that the 
natural rate of unemployment has tended to 
rise over time as a consequence of a number 
of  changing demographic and legislative 
factors, but we don't know the exact size of 
the rate. The official calculation of  the high-
employment budget assumes an unemploy-
ment rate of 5.1  percent. However, recent 
estimates by Phillip Cagan, RobertHall, 
Alfred Tella and others suggest that the figure 
actually should be in the range of 6.0 to 6.S 
percent. 
We can estimate the size of the high-
employment budget at a 6.S-percent unem-
ployment rate by linear interpolation from the 
historical differences between the high-
employment budget and the actual budget. 
Raising the assumed natural rate to 6.5 
percent substantially increases a deficit or reduces a surplus (see chart). For example, in 
1979  the high-employment budget (national-
income accounts basis) would have been in 
deficit by $29.2 billion, compared to an offi-
cially recorded surplus of $6.9 billion. The 
deficit has been understated in past years 
also. The high-employment budget since 
1973 has generated an average annual deficit 
of $33.7 billion, instead of  the officially 
calculated $7.6 billion average deficit. Since 
the level of  the high-employment budget 
measu res the amou  nt  of  permanent crowd  i  ng 
out, the budget as currently calculated 
apparently greatly understates the extent of 
discouragement of private capital formation. 
Changes in the high-employment budget, in 
the short run, indicate changes in the degree 
offiscal stimulus or restraint applied to aggre-
gate demand, and in the longer run, indicate 
changes in the amount of crowding out. But 
the use of  a more realistic unemployment rate 
basically makes only a level adjustment, and 
makes little difference in year-to-year 
changes in the high-employment budget (see 
chart). Both of  these measures of  the high-
employment budget indicate fiscal tightening 
in 1974 and then easing in 1975. Both also 
show a relatively neutral effect on aggregate 
demand during the next two years, but show 
tightening again in 1978 and 1979, and little 
change in 1980. 
While the assumed unemployment rate 
makes little difference to measured changes 
in the degree of short-run fiscal stimulus or 
restraint applied to aggregate spending, it  can 
have a substantial effect on the calculated 
amount of credit permanently preempted by 
the Federal budget. Indeed, the high-
employment budget  -measured at a 
6.S-percent unemployment rate-indicated 
about $29.5 billion of crowding out in 1980. 
This suggests that if  the new administration 
wishes to spur growth, it should take strong 
steps to reduce expendit.ures or increase tax 
receipts in order to el iminate th is cu rrent drag 
on private capital formation. However, actual 
crowding out would be of  this magnitude 
only if  expenditures and receipts were 
measured on a realistic conceptual basis. 
These conceptual problems are examined in 
our next Weekly Letter. 
Adrian W. Throop 
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3 BANKING DATA-TWELfTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large COO1mercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits -total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 





































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
12/24/80  12/17/80 
n.a.  n.a. 
130  127 
n.a.  n.a. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
8,077  5.8 
8,700  7.5 
3,365  10.0 
6,671  15.4 
297  - 1.2 
252  20.3 
590  8.1 
33  - 0.2 
2  0.0 
1,610  4.8 
889  - 3.1 
14,630  24.8 
13,642  27.2 
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